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1. Introduction 
As countries move from basic capacity development into Phase 2 of REDD+ and start 
planning performance-based demonstration activities within their national 
programmes, the question of how the financial benefits of future carbon credits 
and/or other REDD+ payments will be distributed within such national (or sub-
national) programmes becomes increasingly important.  This is because these benefits 
may be the main incentives for the participation of individual stakeholders in REDD+ 
activities.  Before opting in, potential participants will want clarity on what rewards 
they could expect, and under what conditions they will be eligible to receive them. 
There will be a need for transparent, legitimate and easy to understand systems for 
the distribution of the financial benefits from REDD+. 
This InfoBrief discusses a range of feasible options for benefit distribution systems that 
governments could select from.  Whether the international REDD+ architecture 
evolves as a compliance mechanism under UNFCCC or as a global fund, REDD+ has 
been conceived of as a performance or results-based instrument, where performance 
in terms of carbon is generally implied. Benefits accruing to countries are expected to 
be calculated at national level on the basis of their overall achievements in reducing 
emissions or increasing carbon stocks relative to an agreed reference level, measured 
in terms of tons carbon per annumi.  International payments will therefore in all 
probability be delivered centrally or through sub-national jurisdictions on the basis of 
overall performance of the country or jurisdiction compared to its reference level.   
The assumption is often made that within national programmes the financial benefits 
that accrue centrally should simply be shared between participating stakeholders 
according to the performance of each participant, calculated in these same terms. 
However, although a carbon-performance metric may be appropriate at the 
international level, there are three main reasons why it is unlikely to work for the 
distribution of benefits within countries or jurisdictions. These are (a) the difficulties of 
identifying exactly which forest parcels would have been deforested or degraded in 
the absence of REDD+, (b) the uncertainties involved in carbon measurements at the 
local level and the costs of administering benefit distribution or reward systems based 
on carbon performance at the local level (transaction costs) and (c) the fact that much 
forest loss is the result of activities of stakeholders outside of the forest (i.e. from 
agriculture, energy, mining), and if these activities are to be stopped or modified, then 
it may be necessary also to reward non-forest stakeholders, even though it may be 
difficult, if not impossible, to measure the impacts directly in carbon terms. These 
points are elaborated in section 2. We suggest that performance could be assessed in 
other ways, particularly in terms of inputs and effort, and in section 3 we suggest a 
range of alternatives to carbon-performance as the basis for benefit distribution in 
REDD+. We then discuss in section 4 the fact that the fund generated by sales of 
carbon credits at national level is likely to be too limited in size to provide sufficient 
financial incentive for all internal stakeholders and suggest that it will need to be 
supplemented from other sources. Section 5 considers the forms in which incentive 
payments could be made, section 6 considers how such payments should be dealt with 
when the responsible forest managers are not individuals but collectives. In section 7 
we briefly consider the potential advantages of linking the benefit distribution system 
to national systems for REDD+ monitoring and   Measuring, Reporting and Verification 
(MRV).  Conclusions are summarized in section 8.  
 
2. Essential difficulties in distributing REDD+ benefits among stakeholders on the basis 
of carbon performance 
(a) The impossibility of attributing reduced deforestation to individual 
forest parcels  
Although it is possible to monitor which areas of forest have and which have not been 
deforested over a given accounting period, in practice it is very difficult to relate this to 
the efforts of individual communities or specific forest owners, and thus to determine 
who should be rewarded. This is because reduced deforestation and degradation are 
usually not measured at the level of the individual forest parcel but against a baseline 
or reference emission level which reflects what has happened in the past, and what 
will likely happen in the future, over a much larger area.   
For example, if a region is made up of 100 forest parcels, and has had a historical 
deforestation rate of 3%, it would, under a business as usual scenario, be expected to 
lose the equivalent of 3 parcels of forest every year in the future.  If as a result of 
REDD+ activity, the rate of loss is reduced to 2 parcels per year, the region would 
receive credits equivalent to 1 parcel. The difficulty, however, is to know which of the 
many parcels that did not deforest in that year should receive these credits. As Figures 
1-4 show, in year 3, there would be 95 parcels that are not deforested, but the credits 
available for distribution are equivalent to the forest stock of only 1 parcel.  Since most 
deforestation is unplanned, it is impossible to know which parcels would have 
deforested in the absence of REDD+.  
 
 
However, REDD+ includes more than just reduction in deforestation. For example, if 
through improved management, the owners or managers of forest parcels are able to 
increase forest cover, or to increase the density of biomass within the existing forest 
areas, these increases in stock can readily be measured on site and could therefore, 
unlike reductions in deforestation, be attributed directly to the owners or managers.  
This opens the possibility for a dual system of benefit distribution, distinguishing 
benefits for direct and forest-related REDD+ activities which mainly result in increased 
sequestration (stock increases) from those relating to emission reductions (reduced 
rates of deforestation and degradation),  which often stem from REDD+ activities 
outside forests.  This is further discussed in section 3. 
For reductions in deforestation, the only way to test performance at the level of the 
parcel would be to use individual baselines for each and every parcel. Apart from the 
huge transaction costs that would be involved in developing such baselines, a measure 
 
 
Figure 1:       Figure 2: 
Region has 100 intact forest parcels  In year 1, 3 parcels are cleared:  
rate of loss 3% 
 
 
 
Figure  3:      Figure 4: 
Continuing at 3% loss, 6 parcels would be  However, with REDD+, the rate of loss 
is 
cleared by the following year  reduced to 2%.  One parcel is ´saved´.  
BUT HOW CAN WE KNOW WHICH 
PARCEL WOULD HAVE BEEN 
DEFORESTED BUT WAS NOT? 
 
 
of this kind is likely to fail.  Those responsible for a parcel which has never been 
deforested in the past will be at a disadvantage compared to those who have 
considerably deforested their forests in the past, since the latter will be able to claim 
more credits when they start to improve their management.  A performance-based 
distribution system based on this principle will not be considered legitimate by the 
general public, as it does not reward those who have always maintained their forest 
well; clearly, payment systems must also reward past good behavior, even if there is 
no ´additionality´ involved.  As many governments and other organizations working on 
REDD+ projects recognize, systems which fail to do so are not only likely to cause local 
resentment, but may even create perverse incentives, encouraging people to strip 
their forests so that they can later re-grow them for profit.    
 
(b) Uncertainties in carbon estimates and transaction costs involved 
Current REDD+ monitoring activities focus on improving national-level estimation of 
emissions and removals to provide input to international reporting of REDD+ 
performance.  This requires detailed information about changing carbon stocks at the 
local level, which is an expensive undertaking if carried out by professional staff.  The 
transaction costs of measuring carbon stock change at the local level may be reduced if 
the forest owners or REDD+ actors / implementers themselves are involved in this 
monitoring.   However, although monitoring changes in forest carbon stocks is often 
presented as a scientific procedure which can be perfected, in reality there are 
significant uncertainties involved.  If participants at the local level were to be paid on 
the basis of outputs (tons carbon), conservative estimates would have to be applied, 
which would be well below the mean levels found in monitoring.  This might cause 
participants to feel cheated, or to become frustrated, although such conservatism is 
essential to maintain the integrity of the programme.  Moreover, the cost of 
administering reward or benefit distribution systems based on performance as 
ascertained through local measurements would be high, not least because systems 
which link payments directly to outputs in terms of tons of carbon would likely 
encourage participants to over-estimate their achievements and might even 
encourage fraud.   To counteract this, strict regimes of verification would be required, 
with associated costs.  This would itself entail the need for a grievances office for 
participants.    
 
 
 
(c) Since many of the drivers of deforestation involve activities outside 
the forest, it may be necessary also to reward stakeholders who are 
not forest owners or managers 
It is well known that many of the drivers of deforestation have their origins outside of 
the forests, in particular the expansion of agricultural and grazing land, which may be 
stimulated by population growth or by increases in prices of crops and meat. It is clear 
that to succeed, REDD+ will have to tackle such drivers directly.  A national 
government might for example elect to stimulate in the kind of agriculture practices 
that reduce pressure on forests.  It would therefore be quite reasonable that some of 
the financial benefits derived from international ‘sales’ of REDD+ credits should be 
invested in the promotion of these practices, if it can be shown that this is an effective 
way of conserving forests. The underlying principle here is that it is not only the 
owners or managers of forests who could be eligible for benefits, but also actors 
outside the forest.  There could also be other stakeholders, such as intermediary 
agencies, who might legitimately want to claim a share of the financial rewards from 
REDD+, if they are implicated in generating participation of forest users, farmers etc. in 
REDD+ activities which result in decrease emissions or increased sequestration of 
carbon in forests.  It would however be very difficult to make direct quantitative 
assessments of the impact of any such action (whether by a farmer or by a supporting 
agency) on the rate of reduction of deforestation in a given area, with a view to 
rewarding individuals on a per ton carbon basis.  It is clear that a carbon-performance-
based accounting mechanism would not work here, and that an alternative mechanism 
would be needed to establish both the legitimacy of the claims, and the size of the 
benefits to be assigned to them. In the next section we therefore consider some 
alternatives to carbon performance as the basis for benefit distribution.  
 
3. Alternatives to carbon performance as the basis for benefit distribution  
A means to overcome the above-mentioned difficulties is to offer rewards or 
incentives to the stakeholders for sets of activities undertaken in forest management 
or in agricultural practice (i.e.  rewards would be based on inputs or efforts, rather 
than on carbon performance).   The level of payment might be based on (conservative) 
estimates of the likely effects in terms of carbon credits. This is, in fact, how most 
Payment for Environmental Services (PES) schemes are designed. Such systems pay a 
flat rate per hectare to forest owners/managers who agree to carry out certain 
management practices (in other words, the payment is dependent on performance in 
the sense of inputs or efforts, not performance in the sense of carbon outputs). The 
payment is made after checking that the agreed activities have been carried out at the 
level of the individual parcel. The ultimate benefits in terms of water or biodiversity 
conservation are assumed or inferred, but not measured directly. This kind of system is 
generally perceived as ´fair´ by potential participants, because it rewards all those who 
carry out the good practices, including those who have been doing so for many years 
already. Moreover, it requires less detailed monitoring, and is much less open to fraud 
than systems based on carbon-output. 
The options presented here for the design of input-based incentives or rewards are 
suited to the context of a national REDD+ programme in which international funds are 
provided ex-post, based on performance relative to the national Reference Level, and 
received, at least in the first instance, by a central authority. Clearly, the question of 
how inputs (efforts) of individual stakeholders are to be rewarded is highly political, as 
it will involve decisions on who are the real drivers of deforestation, where threats to 
forest are more serious, which forests are more valuable, etc.  If the REDD+ 
programme is to be perceived as legitimate and equitable, the rules of the payment 
system need to be transparent.   
In general terms there are three bases on which input-based payments could be 
calculated:  by estimated opportunity costs, by flat rate per hectare, and variants of 
the latter which involve differentiated bands of flat rates.  All are technically possible, 
but each has its own advantages and disadvantages, as presented below. 
 Payments based on estimated opportunity costs.  Since the financial gains from 
deforestation differ depending on the various drivers of deforestation and the 
alternative land uses that are possible, it can be argued that forest owners/managers 
and farmers will need to receive an incentive which matches these opportunity costs.  
There are two ways to handle this: 
o A payment level which is set centrally for each type of likely land use change.  
The per hectare rates of payment in areas threatened by avocado or palm oil 
plantations, for example, would be higher than rates of payment in areas 
threatened by less profitable commodities such as maize.   While this may be 
economically efficient, it may appear unfair to many participants. 
o Payment levels are fixed through a system of bidding.  Potential participants 
bid, proposing the level of payment they consider would match their costs; a 
central organization would then select which bids to accept (i.e. choosing the 
most cost effective bids on offer; the knowledge that selection will be made in 
this way should encourage people to put in their lowest possible bids.)  This 
system may appear to be ´fairer´ to the potential participants than one in 
which the opportunity costs are determined centrally, but it will not prevent 
the deforestation in areas of high opportunity cost, e.g. for avocados and palm 
oil. 
 Flat rate payments. In this system, the central agency fixes a price (usually per 
hectare) that it is willing to pay in return for good forest management or for good 
agricultural practice. The potential participants are then free to decide if it is worth 
their while to accept this. The advantages are simplicity and apparent fairness, but in 
fact some participants will be receiving more than their real costs and others will be 
receiving less, as opportunity costs vary greatly.  Also, flat rate payment systems are 
often said to be inefficient economically because they involve payments to some 
recipients who would have managed the forests well even in the absence of the 
rewards, who are thus being paid ´unnecessarily´.  However, as we have pointed out 
above, for public policy of the kind involved in national REDD+ programmes, it is 
essential to provide rewards to all who carry out good practice, in order to avoid 
perverse incentives.   
 Variants of flat rate payments. It is possible to develop a banded flat rate system to 
allow variations in payments for specific situations, for example, flat rates could be 
higher: 
o in areas where the opportunity costs of deforestation are likely to be higher, 
i.e. related to the dangers from specific drivers 
o in areas where the threat of deforestation is higher 
o in areas where forest is considered more valuable for other reasons (e.g. for 
provision of other, non-carbon environmental services, or because of scarcity) 
The selection of these different tariff bands would have to be based on clear and 
transparent calculus if it is to be acceptable socially, though it will clearly involve 
political choices based on perceptions of risk and of value.  However, it is a system 
which is relatively easy to administer (easier than opportunity cost estimates and 
bidding systems), and is unlikely to arouse accusations of unfair treatment if the 
criteria are clearly defined.  
As pointed out earlier, national programmes could opt for two different systems of 
benefit distribution; one for reduced deforestation, and one for forest enhancement. 
Rewards for the former might be arranged following any of the above options, while 
rewards for the latter could in principle be related directly to performance in terms of 
tons carbon per hectare, as measured for example by the community or forest owner 
itself using participatory monitoring methods. 
 
 
4. The need to supplement finance from international carbon credits with other 
funds 
It is very evident from the example in Figures 1-4 that at least for the case of 
deforestation, the amount of money available to provide incentives or rewards to 
forest owners/managers or farmers who change their agricultural practices, will be 
very limited. In the example, the funds obtained from credits for the one parcel of 
forest ´saved´ would have to cover incentives to all 95 parcels which have not 
deforested, which means that the amount per parcel would be minimal. For this 
reason it is clear that if meaningful incentives or rewards are to be provided within a 
national programme, additional finance will be needed from other sources, such as 
water companies, certified timber production, biodiversity funds etc, all of which 
support the kinds of forest management practices that also conserve or enhance 
carbon stocks. Perhaps the most obvious place to start would be a national 
programme for payment for fresh water conservation. PES systems for water are often 
quite cost effective and are growing in popularity; they often involve water consumers 
downstream paying a tax or fee on their water bills to improve both the quality and 
the quantity of the water they receive.  These funds are paid to upstream landowners 
to improve forest management or change agricultural practices.  International donor 
funds might also be attracted for water conservation activities, since water is 
increasingly seen as a critical resource.   Whatever the source of the funds, it should be 
clear that payments would be made on an input (effort) basis, and not in terms of 
outputs – which, for example for the case of water, is the only practicable way of 
administering such incentives.   Ideally, funds would be raised from multiple sources so 
that several different services provided by good management would be rewarded, and 
the bundling of funds might raise sufficient financial resources to make such 
management attractive to the land owners.   
 Options that could be considered include:  
 Municipalities or water companies downstream from areas under REDD+ management 
could be asked to include a charge to their consumers to support the improved 
management in the interests of long term water provision 
 Support from international biodiversity funds could be requested as a supplement to 
REDD+ participants, particularly in areas of specially high environmental value 
 Local or international certification of timber could be extended, resulting in a higher 
price for the products of well managed forests 
 National governments could invest additional funds from their own tax base to 
supplement REDD+ payments to stakeholders on the grounds that forest conservation 
and sustainable management of forests has many other benefits to the nation.  
 
5. When to pay and how to pay 
The main focus of many countries in Phase 2 will be to generate interest in 
participation of potential stakeholders (forest owners and managers, farmers, etc.). 
The challenge here is that changes in forest or farm management have up-front costs. 
Part-payment at the start of participation, rather than at the end of the period, and 
payment in gradual steps could have a motivating effect.   This fits much better with a 
benefit distribution system which is based on inputs and efforts, than with one which 
is performance based, since payment in the latter could not be made until the end of 
the accounting period when performance could be assessed.  However the danger 
with advance payment systems is that participants may later fail to comply, or fail to 
comply sufficiently, with the required activities.  As regards the form of the rewards, 
many observers have suggested that participation may be stimulated by incentives 
which are not in the form of cash, but in kind, for example in technical assistance or in 
physical infrastructure. 
The options that could be considered include: 
 Frequency and timing of payments: 
o Split payments, with part on registration and part (after checks have been 
made) at the end of the period (proportions to be decided). 
o Payments made annually in advance, but discontinued if the participant is 
found to be non-compliant. 
These alternatives have implications for the frequency with which verification has to 
be carried out, and for transaction costs relating to payments. 
 Form of payments: 
o All payments in cash 
o Payments in kind, with a given list of options which forest owners/managers 
and farmers may choose from 
o Mixed systems of payment 
6. Distribution within management units 
In some cases, owners/managers and farmers are individuals, in which case the question of 
how to distribute the benefits internally does not arise. But in many cases, the participants are 
not individuals but communities.  Here arises the difficult question of whether rules should be 
imposed from outside to ensure equity, or whether in fact communities should be left to make 
their own decisions on internal distribution. This is a highly contentious issue, upon which 
opinions differ. Much of the literature published so far on REDD+ benefit sharing has focused 
on the fact that internal distribution is frequently not equitable in the eyes of outside 
observers (it is less clear whether within communities, such inequalities are considered  
normal or acceptable.)  It has been suggested  that if payments are made in kind, rather than 
in cash, this problem is less likely to arise, although it may still in some ways be present (e.g. 
building of a paved road will provide more benefits to people with vehicles than those without, 
and its location may be critical in how different people benefit).   
The main issue that will have to be dealt with by governments designing their national REDD+ 
programmes as far as this issue is concerned will be how transparency in the matter of internal 
(horizontal) distribution be promoted: 
  Communities could be asked to state in advance how they plan to distribute the funds 
or what kind of in-kind investments they wish to receive 
 Communities could be asked to account for how they have spent their funds 
 Rules concerning distribution could be promulgated, for example to include benefits to 
landless members of the community and/or women 
 Decisions on distribution could be left entirely to the communities themselves, on the 
basis that they are autonomous organizations with their own internal decision-making 
procedures on such issues. 
 
7. Relation to the national forest monitoring systems  
We have argued that a transparent, legitimate and easy to understand benefit 
distribution system will be essential to the success of REDD+ as countries move into 
Phase 2 and start to implement activities at roots level, albeit initially on a pilot scale. 
At the same time, national governments will be setting up national forest monitoring 
systems, which will be used among other things to support national MRV of their 
REDD+ activities as required by UNFCCC and international carbon funds. These national 
forest monitoring systems will need to include information on drivers of deforestation 
and on the effectiveness of different programmes and policies in dealing with these 
drivers and in reducing emissions, and they will be essential in providing feedback to 
the country on what works and what does not work under REDD+. In this sense, a 
benefit distribution system which focuses on activities and change in management 
practice would link closely with data that is already being systematized. It would 
however focus less on carbon and more on data which may be used to evaluate 
different REDD+ interventions in a broader sense.   In this way, national forest 
monitoring systems would evolve to underpin and stimulate strategies and priorities 
for REDD+ implementation, to track REDD+ activities and their impacts (both carbon 
and non-carbon), and to support the generation and sharing of benefits for the 
multiple REDD+ actors involved, as well as providing data for reporting on REDD+ 
performance in terms of GHG to the international community.  They could be used to 
link the success and failure of different types of incentives and rewards to the activities 
undertaken in different parts of the country and, at a broad scale (though not at the 
level of the individual parcel) to achievements in reducing emissions at the national 
level. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
Benefit distribution systems based on output metrics (calculations relating to 
reductions of emissions of carbon associated with reductions in deforestation and 
degradation) are difficult, if not impossible to implement at the level of individual 
forest parcels, such as forests owned and managed by communities or small 
landowners.  This is because it is impossible to identify who, out of the many land 
owners who have not deforested in any given time period, would have deforested in 
the absence of REDD+, and thus deserve the rewards.  In reality, and to ensure public 
acceptability of the programme, all forest owners who carry out sustainable forest 
management practices need to be rewarded, whether or not they would have engaged 
in unsustainable practices in the absence of REDD+.  This makes an output-based 
system meaningless.   
Moreover, output-based benefit distribution systems are based on measurements 
which involve considerable uncertainty at the local level, and which involve heavy 
transaction costs.   
Finally, it is not only forest owners who may need rewards under national REDD+ 
programmes.  The drivers of deforestation are often outside the forests; stakeholders 
such as ranchers and farmers may be encouraged to reduce their pressure of the 
forest, and thus contribute to reduced deforestation, through changing their 
production practices.  The impacts of such changes will be very difficult to relate 
directly to stock changes in the forests, meaning that it is impossible to calculate 
rewards for these stakeholders on the basis of tons of carbon saved.   
For these reasons we propose the development and adoption of input-based benefit 
distribution systems, in which stakeholders receive benefits according to their 
participation in the conservation or sustainable management of forests or sustainable 
agricultural practices, rather than on the basis of exact calculations of how much 
carbon is sequestered/not emitted as a result of REDD+ activities.  We argue that such 
systems are more technically feasible, more politically acceptable and easier to 
administer, with associated lower costs, partly because of lower requirements for 
detailed carbon monitoring.  One option is to distribute benefits according to 
opportunity costs, either through a centrally fixed payment level for each type of likely 
land use change (which correspond with different opportunity costs) or through a 
system of bidding by interested actors. Another option is that a central agency pays 
flat rates per hectare in return for good forest management or agricultural practice, 
either using a universal rate or different rates to account for varying land use activities 
and opportunity costs. As we have shown in this InfoBrief, these proposed options 
have advantages and disadvantages in terms of efficiency, legitimacy and political 
feasibility. 
It is clear however that payments derived from carbon credits alone will be too small 
to provide sufficient incentives for forest owners/managers or farmers to reduce 
deforestation. We therefore argue that additional finance will be needed from other 
sources. Payment schemes for fresh water conservation are a feasible option to 
provide additional incentives for sustainable management of forests.  
We identified options for when and how to distribute input-based REDD+ benefits 
within the management unit. Payments could be in cash or in kind, and should be 
made at least partially in advance in order to cover investment costs for REDD+ 
projects, which would otherwise form a barrier. Compliance can be stimulated by 
making additional or conditional payments in the medium and long term. Equity of 
distribution of benefits within communities can be supported by requiring 
communities to submit a distribution plan in advance of the project, and/or to account 
for distribution after initiation of the project.      
Finally, we argued that data associated with an input-based benefit distribution 
systems at the local level could usefully  supplement national monitoring systems, as in 
addition to carbon data, these will require information on the success of different 
public policies or programmes in reducing emissions. In this sense the requirements 
for national forest monitoring systems are evolving, such that these systems may play 
a role in underpinning and stimulating strategies and priorities for REDD+ 
implementation, tracking REDD+ activities and their impacts (both carbon and non-
carbon), and supporting the generation and sharing of benefits for the multiple REDD+ 
actors involved, as well as providing the basis for the reporting of REDD+ performance 
in terms of GHG to the international community.   
 
                                                 
i
 Although the suggestions presented here have been expressed in terms of national REDD+ and 
national monitoring systems, under the assumption that carbon accounting systems will be set up at this 
level, they could, in the short term, be applied at sub-national or jurisdictional level, and could be 
appropriate even for large REDD+ projects in the voluntary sector, since these also need internal 
monitoring and benefit distribution systems. 
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